Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical, strategic and economic blueprint for his contest with the US and the West has him seeking alliances and making deals with rogue nations, no matter how insalubrious, as long as they serve Moscow’s needs. But how reliable is Russia in keeping its agreements and helping its allies?
In early 2025, Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement for military cooperation. Despite the two nations flaunting their so-called alliance to the world and snubbing the West’s sanctions on both Russia and Iran, the treaty lacks beef. This show of consonance sent a message, but a review of the pact shows that it contains no clause obligating one nation to defend the other against any foreign military aggression.
Putin’s military agreement with Iran is more of an interdependent cooperation endeavour.
In contrast to the Iran pact, Putin went so far as to sign a military alliance in 2024 with North Korea, promising mutual military assistance with forces if attacked.
North Korea has provided armaments—albeit a lot of defective armaments, sometimes too dangerous for Russian troops to use—and between 11,000 and 16,000 troops for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.
Should North Korea go to war with South Korea and/or the US, would the Kremlin send troops to help? Russia has a record of not helping friends when in need if it’s not in its interests. Who the adversaries are is also a deciding factor.
Putin had the foresight not to sign a military alliance with Iran that contained a mutual defence clause to avoid going head-to-head with the US, Israel or any Arab states. Moscow knew Iran was a high risk.
About Russia’s reliability as an ally, Putin virtually abandoned President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian armed forces in 2024. Russian troops in the country stood by as the Syrian rebels, led by the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), beat the Syrian army, forcing Assad into exile in Russia.
And there was Venezuela, and the President Nicolás Maduro capture by the US… The Kremlin did virtually nothing to help its old friend, except for the usual public condemnations. Predictably, Russia stayed out of it militarily. Putin himself remained silent.
During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Armenia in 2023, Russia abandoned its old ally, Armenia. Putin decided to prioritize Russia’s ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey (especially because Turkey is a NATO ally). Allegedly, Russian peacekeepers stood by and did nothing—it seems to be a pattern.
At present, a coordinated offensive by Al Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) Tuareg rebels has resulted in Mali losing swaths of northern and central parts of the country. The hybrid private military company (PMC), The Africa Corps, Russian mercenaries fighting for President Goita’s junta, have withdrawn from areas; they have performed poorly throughout Mali’s counterinsurgency war. How committed Russia is to protecting Mali is hard to say, but given Russia’s record, it doesn’t look promising. If the JNIM and the FLA keep up their momentum, it should be no surprise to see the Kremlin suddenly cut support to Goita’s government, Russia’s MOD withdrawing the Africa Corps, and altogether abandoning Mali with a ‘Do svidaniya’.
While the hybrid-PMCs Wagner and The Africa Corps conveniently serve the Kremlin’s purposes mainly in Africa, the Kremlin would avoid getting directly involved in other conflicts, especially one pitting it against the US.
The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia militarily; it has become an attritional war. Moscow cannot afford any new wars.
As the agreement stands, unlike the North Koreans, we should not expect to see Iranian troops officially on the frontlines helping Russia in Ukraine or anywhere. However, there are reports of Iranians on the ground in the Ukraine war providing the Russians with drone technical support.
Russia is abiding by the Iran pact by providing advice, tactical information (based on experience from Ukraine), material assistance, and technical and satellite intelligence. The pact provides Russia with a reciprocal arrangement by helping Iran, especially after Russia’s heavy losses in Ukraine, in part due to US military assistance to Ukraine.
Iran has provided Russia with a variety of defence systems since 2021. Russia has received up to 4 billion dollars of Iranian military equipment and technology, including vests, helmets, ammunition, artillery shells, small arms, drones, short-range missiles, etc.
Russia has an Iranian Shahed drone production facility in Russia, located within the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, in Tatarstan.
And Russia has improved and upgraded the Shahed from its original form. Reports indicate that Russia can now sustain itself without Iranian-sourced drones.
If Russia can afford to share, it is possible that Russia could provide up-to-date, made-in-Russia Shahed and other drone systems to Iran, if it is not doing so already.
For the moment, the US has military resources so focused on the Iran war that it is affecting military supplies to Ukraine. Of course, this benefits Russia.
Also, the war in Iran offers Russia a suitable distraction from the war in Ukraine.
As mentioned in a previous report on the Iran war, Russia has limited leverage in Iran and the region, while the military cooperation agreement provides the Kremlin with some influence. With the Iran war, Moscow will proceed carefully but will maintain bargaining space with Washington on other issues, not least the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
The Iran-Russia military cooperation pact is about overlapping interests, and, like any military agreement in history, it is only as good as the signatories make it. Russia will make it good as long as it is good for Russia.
–RdM