A Former Special Forces CIA Advisor shared with me what he thinks about the contracting of two previously unknown American PMSCs (Private Military Security Companies) tasked with running checkpoints in Gaza. The former advisor also has experience working in the PMSC world.
Please note that the opinions expressed by the source are his own and do not necessarily reflect my own opinions.
The source said:
“A lot depends on the people that are hired. It looks from here they are hiring people that have a background in UW combat. There is a difference on the mentally , look what happened with Black Water when they thought they were in danger without thinking they went to the fight mode instead of thinking it out and killed several people that had nothing to do with the war. That is what happens when you hire SF who have been in combat in the area that they are trying to protect VIPs from danger. Most of the BW people were SEALS who have a different mentally. I had to work with them for several years. Different mind set.“
As mentioned in my previous post on this topic, ‘The Grey Men of Gaza, Contracting US and Egyptian PMC/PMSC To Manage Checkpoints and Security; Will It Work?‘, I see the hiring of the two US PMSCs and the Egyptian PMSC as a test run, an experiment and a stop-gap solution. It’s not a bad idea, but let’s see how this works or doesn’t work out.
Also, what are and would be the PMSCs dynamics with Israel, the IDF, Israeli Border Police, the UN, the US, etc.? Who gives the orders at the end of the day? Who will they answer to?
I presume one of the reasons for contracting these entities is optics. Using PMSCs helps suggest that they are neutral, not a state actor or a government security force.
Meanwhile, manning these checkpoints, I presume these contractors will have a mandate for security and enforcing law. Yet, if these companies are using former SF contractors as is being claimed, it’s worth pointing out that these men are not border guard specialists, this is a different task from soldiering– something the IDF learned with the Intifadas.
The contractors (and the powers that be that hired them) will have to contend with certain risks, including bored kids throwing stones, or kids throwing stones as part of a planned operation, well-armed bandits/criminals –who have been robbing aid convoys and directly combatting Hamas men– negative reactions to the PMSCs’ presence by Gazans, Hamas, and other militants, etc.
I wouldn’t be surprised if a suicide bomber attack happened at a checkpoint. I might not happen but the possibility is there. (AQ terrorists have recently been involved with the war in Gaza.) The thing about Jihadis is that they will find a reason to strike, e.g. these men are American infidels so that’s a reason; the Egyptians are at peace with Israel, so that’s a reason; the contractors are held under suspicion and viewed as not neutral but are seen as state actors answering to the Israelis or the US, etc.
As I often say, “Culture eats strategy for breakfast”. I hope the PMSCs have taken this into consideration. Most don’t.
–RdM
Very well said Royce. I looked into the PMC World as well after Desert Storm. I found out it was the norm to have four PMCs providing Overwatch for 300 thousand sq. feet Industrial Operations. Personal loadouts, no Crew Served Platforms, and incredibly understrength. Some also lost their lives.
I think you also eluded to solid ROEs. ROEs are incredibly important, especially when you are dealing with jihadists.
I worked with guys who were sent into Iraq right after the invasion in 2003; they told me they hit the ground running. It was very much a case of playing things by ear and working out what’s what, improvising, sometimes at the cost of PMC/PSC lives; it was an adapt and survive mode. Eventually, it all got more streamlined and the companies got it sorted.