Before the U.S. and Israel war on Iran and throughout this conflict, Russia and China have been strategically implementing realpolitik, each intertwining their influence across the Middle East. They developed and maintained diplomatic, economic, and security ties to varying degrees with all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, but also with their rival, Iran, including indirect and possibly direct support for Iran-backed Houthis and other regional pro-Iran militants.
Through these overlapping commitments, Moscow and Beijing have applied dual agency in the region, impacting the war’s dynamics and the diplomatic chessboard.
Moscow and China have formally condemned U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran, and have called for a negotiated settlement and de-escalation, strategically positioning themselves for influence as peace intermediaries for the GCC and Iran.
At the same time, both are covertly and overtly supporting Iran, while Iran and its regional allies attack GCC member states.
For example, GCC members know Russia and Iran signed the 2025 Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which reinforces military, intelligence, and economic ties between the two nations, focusing on defence industry cooperation, joint military exercises, and technology sharing.
And that before the joint U.S.-Israel Operation Epic Fury of February 2026, Russia had received billions of dollars worth of Iranian military equipment and technology, including Iranian Shahed drones. Moscow built Shahed production facilities located within the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan.
In a role reversal, Moscow now supplies Tehran with new and improved Russian-made Shahed drones (such as HESA Shahed 136/Geran-2 one-way drones) for Iran’s war efforts.
Throughout the Iran conflict, Russia adheres to the Iran pact by providing advice, tactical information, material assistance, and technical and satellite intelligence.
The GCC is mindful that China also supplies Tehran with material support (including covert dual-use material), that it is Iran’s biggest oil customer, and that Iran is very dependent on China.
But GCC member Saudi Arabia also has China as its biggest oil client, giving Beijing significant clout.
That clout and dual agency paid off when Beijing brokered the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. This diplomatic deal also temporarily de-escalated direct fighting in the Yemeni Civil War against the Houthis but did not end hostilities. China had conveniently become the region’s new broker.
In the context of the present U.S.-Iran conflict, in an attempt to further escalate regional tensions, Iran has launched airstrikes targeting GCC member states.
And Iran-backed Yemen-based Houthi and Iraqi-based Shia militias (e.g. Popular Mobilization Forces [PMF] and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq [IRI]) have also launched attacks from their respective zones specifically targeting Saudi Arabia and its shipping, facilities, and infrastructure, including civilian airports.
Because the Houthi and Iraqi Shia militias are receiving Iranian-supplied arms, parts, components and material, China and Russia are, by extension, indirectly (or perhaps on occasion directly) supplying Iran’s proxies.
In Iraq, the PMF and IRI Shia militias and their allies are directly receiving arms, drones and missiles, and funding from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF), much of it through cross-border routes.
Reports in late October claim that two airstrikes (presumed to be by Israel) on two sites in Iraq were where Iran-backed militias had stockpiled Tehran-sourced “Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defence systems”.
In Yemen, Houthis are receiving Iranian-supplied equipment, arms and parts for arms assembly through smuggling networks, component-part shipping, via land and sea routes.
Western intelligence reports have suggested that Russia has directly provided limited assistance with small arms and satellite targeting data to help the Houthis strike ships in the Red Sea.
While Beijing communicates directly with the Houthi leadership, China has questionably established a safe-passage guarantee for Chinese-flagged and Chinese-owned commercial ships sailing through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Currently, Saudi Arabia is leading a pro-government anti-Houthi coalition in the Yemeni Civil War; the ongoing Operation ‘Dawn of Yemen’ offensive is meant to retake Yemeni territory and to secure the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and shipping lanes.
GCC member United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an ally in the anti-Houthi coalition and stands out as a key player in Yemen’s war and the overall regional conflict.
Previously, the UAE and Saudi Arabia had diverging interests in Yemen—an indicator of how GCC members will act unilaterally—but they have recently coordinated and re-established cooperation as part of this anti-Houthi coalition. Major advances and attacks by Houthi forces of late forced the UAE and Saudi Arabia to realign their goals in the Yemeni Civil War.
It is important to emphasize that the pro-government coalition is facing Houthis equipped with Iranian-supplied weapons systems, some of which have elements in one form or another sourced from Russia and China.
Meanwhile, in a display of realpolitik and Chinese dual agency, reports claim that Saudi Arabia covertly acquired Chinese DF-15A missiles and used them against the Houthis.
Simultaneously, Riyadh is urging Beijing to pressure Tehran and restrain the Houthis, even as China supplies Iran.
Further illustrating the complexities of China’s dual agency, Saudi Arabia participates in joint naval exercises with China called Blue Sword, despite Beijing’s support for Iran.
On the Russian side of the coin, Riyadh also signed a Russian defence deal worth roughly €2.3 billion in 2021, emblematic of seemingly conflicting interests and double-dealing. Despite sanctions on Russia and its support for Iran, the Saudis did not cancel the deal. Reports say Riyadh bought Pantsir-S1M air defence systems, 39 trucks, 10 command vehicles, and hundreds of missiles.
GCC states are walking a diplomatic tightrope—managing relations with Beijing and Moscow and their dual agencies, while maintaining long-established strong ties with the U.S., the UK, and other Western nations. Notably, the UK has announced that it will deploy jets to defend Saudi Arabia from Iran-backed Houthi attacks from Yemen.
Ultimately, as dual agents, Russia and China are not reliable security guarantors; neither will militarily defend any GCC member state if the war escalates, and neither would defend Iran—Russian President Putin avoided including a mutual defence clause in the 2021 Iran-Russia defence pact.
Moscow and Beijing prefer to hedge strategically, pursue diplomatic and economic interests with the GCC, keep the U.S. off balance with the war (draw attention away from the Russia-Ukraine War), and continue acting as dual agents for sway.
Policymakers in the GCC and the West recognize the dual-agency game Moscow and Beijing play. GCC members will continue to pursue their interests individually, seeking strategic autonomy while maneuvering within Russia’s and China’s conflicting dual-agency framework.
–RdM
